The 1810 British takeover of Isle de France: the whys of a real walk-over
Written by Editor Monday, 13 December 2010 12:25
If the August 1810 French victory over the British at Grand Port in the south-east was a real feat, being the only naval battle won by the former over the latter during the Napoleonic era, the December 1810 British victory over the French in the land battles of the north-west very much resembled a walk-over. The French resistance was minimal and there was a number of reasons for this, the most important being the complete absence of support of the metropolis to the French colonies in the Mascarenes.
This fact as well as the means, privateering expeditions, used by Governor Decaen to ensure the survival of the abandoned Isle de France are emphasized in the enquiry carried out by the French authorities on the 3rd December 1810 capitulation: “On ne doit pas oublier que le capitaine général, privé depuis plusieurs années des secours de la métropole, avait porté tous ses soins à soutenir la marine et à l’accroître, parce que les prises qu’elle faisait pouvaient seules lui fournir les moyens d’alimenter et de soutenir la colonie.”(1) The underlined parts are Charles Giraudeau’s.
However, even with the support of the metropolis, the troops stationed in small colonies like Isle de France were limited in number to around 2000 soldiers. This proved to be a serious drawback when, following the November/December 1810 British invasion, the French had to fight forces which were five to ten times superior in number.
None other than Emperor Napoleon himself had a note inserted in the “Moniteur Universel” of 16 July 1811 to demonstrate that the British walk-over of December 1819 in Isle de France was not such a glorious feat, after all: “ Au mois de février 1811, en réponse à un discours du Trône aux Communes qui exaltait les récents succès de l’Angleterre, l’Empereur avait fait insérer au Moniteur une note officielle, dont l’objet était de démontrer que, maîtres des mers, les Anglais devaient nécessairement s’emparer de nos petites colonies, dont les garnisons “ne pouvaient être au plus que de 2000 hommes.” (2)
The Emperor further argued: “Plus nombreuses, elles (les garnisons) n’auraient pas pu subsister. Il était évident que 2000 hommes, à mille lieues de la patrie, ne résisteraient point lorsqu’ils deviendraient l’objet des attaques successives de 12 000 hommes. Cela est incontestable, et bien plus juste encore, si on pense que Decaen n’avait pas 2000 hommes et qu’il avait été attaqué par 20 000.”(Idem) This why another pro-French historian, taking into consideration the far more superior British forces, could write: “ Les Anglais (j’entends les historiens anglais quii cherchent à flatter l’amour-propre national) n’ont pas le droit d’être fiers de la conquête de l’Ile de France dans de telles conditions, après que, toujours, sur mer comme sur terre, ils ont été battus à armes égales.”(3)
The British storm troops bombarded by the French from Batterie Dumas to prevent the former to invade Port Louis, but to no avail as the British soon overcame that last obstacle and subdued the French, constraining General Decaen to surrender. (Source: Eight Views of the Mauritius, R. Temple)f the August 1810 French victory over the British at Grand Port in the south-east was a real feat, being the only naval battle won by the former over the latter during the Napoleonic era, the December 1810 British victory over the French in the land battles of the north-west very much resembled a walk-over. The French resistance was minimal and there was a number of reasons for this, the most important being the complete absence of support of the metropolis to the French colonies in the Mascarenes.
The recourse to a formidable intelligence demobilizing the enemy
Another potent factor behind the victory of the British was the recourse to a formidable intelligence that caused defection (even encouraged treason) among the local population who was promised a better and happier life under a British government.
“Mais ce qui a facilité leurs succès, ce fut cet espionnage continuel et sans vergogne qu’ils ont établi dans cette colonie. Enfin, il faut que l’historien honnête ait le courage de le dire bien haut, la trahison leur a ouvert les voies ici comme ailleurs!Mon frère Prosper a découvert au British Museum un “plan d’attaque contre l’Ile de France” livré aux Anglais par un officier français, un sieur de Grand-Pré, en 1793. Il fut envoyé au gouverneur de l’Inde, le Marquis de Wellesley. Le traître se dissimule derrière des opinions anti-républicaines!”
The French officer Ollier Grand-Pré manifestly belonged to this class of “French royalists, who were said to detest the Bonapartists more than the British.”(4) It is not strange then that “royalists provided the use of their slaves to serve as guides and messengers for the British on shore.”(Idem)
On the other hand, during the British naval blockade of Isle de France, slaves themselves came forward to provide information and intelligence to the potential invaders. And what about the proclamations distributed by the British to the local inhabitants?
Can one imagine the disastrous demobilizing effect on the population of land-owners and slave-owners of such propagandas as “The only views of Britain are Justice, Commerce and Plenty. Our Government is generous - it rewards the cultivator and the workman as well as the soldier and the sailor, the utmost value of their services without the least deduction; the French pay in paper and bills of exchange, and we pay in Spanish coin” or “Your own property of all kinds will be respected, you will have the full exercise of your religion and your religious establishments shall be maintained with all their privileges - your charitable institutions shall be respected -your laws and customs continued and honored.”?(Idem)
The British landing near Cap Malheureux on the 29th November 1810. (Source: Eight Views of the Mauritius, R. Temple)
Le débarquement des troupes britanniques près de Cap Malheureux le 29 novembre 1810. (Source: ‘Eight Views of the Mauritius, R. Temple)
Irresolute French submerged by superior British forces
It is obvious that the French troops, inferior in number and probably informed about the damage caused to the morale of the local inhabitants by the British propaganda, would neither be able nor motivated to oppose any strong resistance to the enemy forces.
The first indication of the unwillingness of the French forces to wage frontal attacks against the British was given on the very first day of the landing when the French “not desiring to wait our attack, on retiring from Fort Marlatic, blew up a portion of its works.” (5)
They then started the long retreat towards Port Louis. Skirmishes on the way, even those where Generals Decaen and Vandermaesen in persons and their troops were engaged, turned out in favour of the British although the latter too had some casualties.
Leaving Powder Mill, the British initiated the final and decisive phase of the attack with the occupation of Long Mountain by a battalion of Sepoys and the capture and destruction of the French batteries at Tombeau and Tortues bays, coupled with the approach of their warships, thus opening the way to the invasion of Port Louis by both the inland and the sea forces. The scene was set for General Decaen to capitulate, influenced in this by “the timidity and the irresolution betrayed by the National Guards” (Idem) which formed part of the French forces.
“On n’est jamais mieux trahi que par les siens,” goes the French proverb. This is proof conclusive enough that the British conquered the island not only on the ground of numerical and tactical superiority, but on account of the efficient psychological warfare they led on the local population and forces prior to the final onslaught.
DODO
References
Charles Giraudeau in “Revue Bleue (revue politique et littéraire), No. 19, 6 novembre 1897”
Henri Prentout, “L’Ile de France sous Decaen” , Paris: Hachette, 1901
Adrien d’Epinay, “Renseignements pour server à l’histoire de l’île de France jusqu’à l’année 1810, inclusivement”
Marina Carter & Mark S. Hall, “Grand Port : Untold Stories”, CRIOS, MPG Books Group, U.K., 2010
Collection d’Epinay (Carnegie Library, Curepipe) “Account of the Conquest of the Mauritius…by an Officer who served on the 1810 expedition”
